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 PADRAIG HOGAN
 In an article entitled 'The psychologist's contribution to educational research' [I] Pro-
 fessors J. D. Nisbet & N. J. Entwistle begin by surveying briefly different definitions of
 educational research itself with a view to drawing a distinction between "pure research in
 the social sciences and educational research in the area of the applied sciences" [2].
 Having suggested this distinction the authors clearly favour a definition which would
 remove educational research from the category of pure to that of applied research and,
 accordingly, their own definition states that "educational research consists in careful,
 systematic attempts to understand the educational process and, through understanding, to
 improve its efficiency" [3]. Pursuing the consequences for educational enquiry of the
 definition they themselves outline, Nisbet & Entwistle point out that
 this shift in emphasis from 'understanding' to 'improvement' is likely to be dis-
 puted by many who are active in what they claim to be wholly respectable
 educational research which does not aim at 'improvement'-such as historical
 studies and comparative education. [4]
 Although allowing that a broader definition must be accepted for those educational
 studies which 'do not aim at improvement' the professors emphasise that educational
 research which seeks to influence the conduct of events must be envisaged "in practical
 terms, with reference to conditions as they are" [5]. Not surprisingly the behavioural
 sciences, particularly psychology and sociology, gain an easy ascendancy in this scheme
 but, more particularly, empirical studies in psychology and sociology are now awarded
 pride of place in educational research.
 The significance of the above-mentioned article-apart from any initial significance
 conferred by the distinguished reputation of its authors-rests in its forthrightness on a
 number of issues which usually remain untackled or only lightly touched upon in the
 literature of education [6]. First, in its opening sentences it draws a clear and deliberate
 distinction between, on the one hand, 'pure' or basic educational research and, on the
 other, 'practical' or applied research. Secondly, this distinction is made more complete by
 describing applied research in education in terms of empirical studies in psychology and
 sociology, as distinct from more inclusive conceptions of psychology and sociology.
 Thirdly, Nisbet & Entwistle, in arguing a case for the more restricted definition, make the
 important claim that "a definition which includes the notion of 'improvement' is in-
 creasingly being applied in deciding priorities in educational research" [7].
 These points, and particularly the third one, have a decisive importance, as the ap-
 propriateness of the critique about to be attempted here depends largely on the extent to
 which Nisbet & Entwistle's claim is an accurate one, for if it is not accurate to any wide-
 spread degree then the critique itself would, in that degree, be unnecessary. Pursuing this
 a little further it is important to state clearly at the outset that the object of the critique is
 not just the stated position of Nisbet & Entwistle; neither is it in any accurate sense a
 questioning of the right to a central place in educational research of the disciplines of
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 psychology or sociology. Rather its object is the growing tendency at an international level
 to conceive of educational research itself in terms of the 'narrower definition', the essential
 features of which have been clearly described by Nisbet & Entwistle.
 What must be assessed then before the critique can get under way is the extent to which
 the 'growing tendency' mentioned above is just that; or, in other words, the extent to
 which educational research has become primarily an empirical investigation of aspects of
 the learning process within the context of 'conditions as they are'. To establish conclusively
 that this is the way educational research has developed and continues to develop would
 require nothing less than a detailed global survey of the recently completed work and the
 projects in hand of all institutions where educational research is seriously undertaken and
 of the organisations under whose auspices it is undertaken. This would be a well nigh
 endless task, even for a team of investigators, so instead of attempting to establish any-
 thing in this way it might be more fruitful to concentrate on a few points which evidence
 the growth to prominence of empirical studies in educational research.
 Firstly, the funding of educational research studies is predominantly in favour of
 empirical projects which aim at investigating and improving aspects of a particular
 educational system, along the lines detailed by Nisbet & Entwistle. Indeed in the political
 climates of most western countries, public monies spent on non-empirical educational
 research would perhaps most likely be seen, from the point of view of funding agencies,
 much in the same category as money spent on 'the arts' (i.e. not a priority area for resource
 allocation). Secondly, the training of educational research workers tends to emphasise the
 importance of developing the skills of statistical measurement, data analysis, question-
 naire design and of developing also a fluency in the language and concepts of the be-
 havioural sciences, particularly terms which can be given operational definition [8].
 Thirdly, a survey of any issue of published abstracts of dissertations presented for higher
 degrees in North America and Europe indicates that the great majority of studies under-
 taken are empirical in nature [9]. Fourthly, in the large American publication Encyclo-
 paedia of Educational Research two articles deal with the topic of educational research
 itself. The text of these presuppose that educational enquiry is almost exclusively an
 empirical-scientific pursuit, despite the remark in the editors' preface that they view
 educational research in a much broader way [IO]. Finally, the style of educational writing
 in recent years has changed gradually, but dramatically. The number of books on educa-
 tion has increased rapidly and has largely become the province of technical experts. This
 trend is considered in some detail by W. Kenneth Richmond in his critical survey of the
 literature of education. He concludes that with the arrival of the technical expert in the
 field of educational research "it is as though there is no longer any place (in the literature)
 for human warmth, only for clinical concepts, desiccated statistics and aseptic analysis"
 [ii].
 Taken together, these five points suggest that the predominant outlook in educational
 research at present is one which shifts the methodological perspective of that research
 itself ever more in the direction of a scientific empiricism. The progressive ascendancy of
 this perspective bears witness to the extent to which educational research itself is be-
 coming identified with the 'narrower definition' described above and for this reason calls
 for a searching investigation not only into the current position but also into the nature of
 educational research itself. A preliminary attempt in this direction follows here.
 THE DECISIVE IMPORTANCE OF PRESUPPOSITIONS IN METHODICAL
 ENQUIRY
 One might begin by examining some of the unstated assumptions of the more prevalent
This content downloaded from 149.157.61.163 on Tue, 15 Aug 2017 08:57:56 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 A Critique of Educational Research 143
 concept of educational research just outlined and then proceed to consider their conse-
 quences with a view to establishing the extent to which an appropriate and adequate
 foundation for research has been established. First, then, there is in this concept a strong
 assumption that historical, comparative or philosophical studies do not have a direct
 relevance, or are of secondary importance, to any educational research which might
 include in its purposes a practical concern for improvements in the conduct of formal
 education. Secondly, the nature of the shift in emphasis from 'understanding' to 'im-
 provement', from the learning process itself to 'conditions as they are' assumes an existing
 educational system, rather than education per se, as the context of enquiry. Consequently,
 it will be argued, the term 'understanding' loses its vital significance for research and, in a
 subtle but decisive way, becomes itself effectively redefined as: understanding the par-
 ticulars of an existing educational system. Thirdly, and most importantly, the extent to
 which educational research simply, or merely, adopts the 'empirical' procedures of the
 social sciences, particularly 'empirical' psychology and 'empirical' sociology, marks the
 extent of its dependence on the methodology of the natural sciences, on which all 'em-
 pirical' enquiry is based. The critique will propose that an automatic or uncritical adop-
 tion of these methods overlooks the question of the nature of the process, object, or being
 to be examined, i.e. whether it is properly to be conceived of as organic, inorganic or
 human.
 Turning now to consider each of these assumptions, let us start by examining the
 consequence of the first one, namely the effective relegation of non-empirical studies,
 particularly those of a historical, comparative or philosophical nature, to a position of
 secondary importance in any research concerned with practical educational improvement.
 Do the reasons which might explain this relegation also provide its justification? These
 reasons themselves must rest on an assumption that comparative, historical and philo-
 sophical studies are concerned essentially with something other than the 'real world'
 where practical education takes place, although it usually remains unclear what precisely
 this kind of assumption regards the proper domain of non-empirical enquiry to be. When
 serious attention is given to this question however-that of the proper domain of non-
 empirical studies-it becomes clear that, in a more radical sense than with empirical
 studies, they provide fertile grounds upon which far-reaching educational improvements
 can be based. Historical, philosophical and comparative studies can bring to light and
 articulate ideas, insights and aspirations which transcend those of the established edu-
 cational practice and provide a fruitful source of arguments for the qualitative improve-
 ment or transformation of that practice at its most formal and informal levels.
 The following illustration should help to clarify this point. The notions of Permanent
 Education and Recurrent Education which have recently become central in educational
 discourse nationally and internationally, are based on a distinctly philosophical argument.
 This argument holds that education is inadequately conceived unless it is, from the start,
 placed firmly in the context of one's unfolding experience over the entire span of one's
 lifetime [I2]. Existing educational provision on the other hand, rests, for the most part,
 on the belief that the years of one's childhood and youth are the years of one's education,
 and in this way education is usually seen and conducted as a preparation for life in society
 which is completed in one's youth. Historical studies show that this identification of
 education with the widespread completion of training and preparation is a development
 of the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries which can broadly be linked to the con-
 sequencies of unprecedented industrialisation and urbanisation [I3]. Historical studies of
 educational ideas and of educational institutions show further that older notions of
 education were quite distinct from the notion of a widespread completion of preparation
 and training in youth and were concerned rather with the development of the intellectual
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 capacities of a minority, often with a view to continuing involvement with scholarship of
 various kinds during the course of one's lifetime [I4]. Comparative studies of education in
 different societies offer further perspectives on, and help further to bring to fullness, the
 notions of Permanent Education and Recurrent Education. For instance, a study of the
 educational systems of eastern countries [I5], or 'Third World' countries [I6], shows that
 Permanent Education is a notion which has grown up out of the western tradition of
 education, that its challenge is indeed a most radical one for educational improvement and
 is directed specifically at the roots of the conventional pattern of education in western
 countries. Other examples could also be drawn upon to show that, in a primary sense,
 studies of a non-empirical nature, more so than empirical studies, can articulate the kind
 of thinking which gives to practical educational discourse its essential vitality, and to
 suggestions for educational improvement a more fundamental sense of context and direc-
 tion.
 Challenges of the nature just outlined are however likely to remain overlooked by an
 empirical research which considers as its primary concern that of understanding the
 particulars of a given educational system with a view to improving that system's efficiency.
 This restriction in the scope of enquiry and understanding which the second assumption
 brings about means that educational research, in the narrower definition, engages itself
 primarily with questions defined by the rationale of an existing educational system and of
 its quantitative extension rather than with questions of its qualitative improvement or
 transformation. This is not to suggest that the application of the fruits of empirical studies
 does not supply more efficient and more humane means of reaching and of extending the
 goals of any particular educational system, but it is to argue that such application leaves
 these goals largely unquestioned and the character of the system itself largely unaltered.
 Critically viewed, moreover, the restriction of scientific purpose in educational research
 to an examination of 'conditions as they are' or, more formally, to an investigation of the
 particulars of a given educational system, contains an anomaly, particularly if the investi-
 gation explicitly claims to be scientific and lays claim to the title 'educational research'.
 Again, an example might serve to illustrate this anomaly.
 A genuinely scientific impulse arises from an unconditional desire to understand
 (otherwise it is pseudo-scientific) and it therefore seeks to get to the very heart of its
 object of enquiry. Wherever the method adopted to facilitate this enquiry attains the
 character of an unquestioned methodology, or more precisely 'method-ideology', the
 enquiry is no longer unconditional but its own understanding is rather conditioned by the
 operations permitted by the methodology. When this happens in any scientific discipline
 investigations may continue to occur, but the status of the discipline itself-its claim to
 further the search for truth-is unlikely to be advanced unless and until the methodology
 is broken asunder and re-established on a different basis. Scientific positivism in the
 nineteenth century, for instance, insisted that observable phenomena and positive facts
 were the only legitimate material for scientific investigation. The development of 'molec-
 ular', and later 'quantum' physics, which began by the positing of hypothetical, as dis-
 tinct from observable 'molecules', had first to reject the methodology of scientific positivism
 and only out of this rejection could physics advance to show that there was infinitely more
 to the natural order than could be observed, even through a microscope. Similarly,
 philosophical positivism in the first part of the twentieth century insisted that the only
 legitimate objects for philosophical enquiry were, first, formal propositions of undisputed
 fact, i.e. tautological propositions merely elaborating the logical properties of definitions
 and, secondly, propositions which could either be finally verified or finally rejected by
 empirical observation. This philosophical approach ruled out from enquiry the entire
 field of human experience as it unfolds in, and is experienced by individuals. The methodo-
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 logical implications of this can be seen in Behaviourism, which takes as its datum aspects
 of the exhibited behaviour of humans rather than the world of experience which underlies
 that behaviour.
 Bringing these points to bear on the assumption under consideration, one can appraise
 more clearly a definition of educational research which understands itself primarily in
 terms of investigations of the exhibited behaviours and features of a particular educational
 system, and, accordingly, which removes to the background investigations which seek to
 bring more dimensions of the system to light in a more inclusive context. It now becomes
 clear that such a definition, notwithstanding its fruits, has not escaped the behaviourist
 legacy of positivism. In so far as it fails to establish self-critically from the start an adequate
 conception of the field to be studied, namely education per se, empirical educational
 research loses sight of the necessity for understanding to be unconditional in its aim and
 accordingly it must suspend its claim to be a genuinely scientific endeavour. The conse-
 quence of this loss moreover, namely the removal of non-empirical educational studies to a
 secondary position, betrays the influence of the 'ruling out' operations of positivism and
 reveals more clearly the questionable nature of the claim to scientific status.
 The third assumption, which uncritically adopts the methods of the natural sciences
 for the study of education, is closely related to the second, which, it was argued, leads to an
 inadequate grasp of the field to be studied. In considering this third assumption our
 attention will be more closely focused on the methodological issues touched upon above
 and will be particularly concerned with the question of the appropriateness of the methods
 of the natural sciences to the task of bringing a satisfactory understanding of education
 within our grasp. The methods of the natural sciences presuppose a decisive distinction,
 indeed a dichotomy, between the scientist and the objects of scientific investigation. Much
 of the fruitfulness of scientific research can be attributed to the very decisiveness with
 which the dichotomy is established and the rigour with which it is maintained. The
 scientist is conceived of here as a detached objective mind, observing, classifying and
 noting accurately the characteristics and behaviours exhibited by the entity or process
 under investigation. On the basis of data gathered in this way significant issues are brought
 to the fore, hypotheses are formulated, and are verified, rejected or reformulated as they
 are tested and monitored by further objective scrutiny. In all of this procedure, described
 as 'empirical verification', careful attention is given to preserving the objectivity of the
 scientist: his detachment and differentiation in status from the material under investi-
 gation. The scientist has the methodological status of 'observer' while his object has the
 status of being 'observed'. Without detracting in any way from the fruits of these in-
 vestigations-namely, the products of inventions, discoveries and technological develop-
 ments which are taken for granted in our everyday lives-it remains open to question
 whether these methodical procedures are the exclusive means by which the natural order
 in its fullness can be understood. What is decidedly more questionable however, and
 what concerns us directly here, is whether the methodology of the natural sciences, or
 any adaptation of it, can in any but the most tentative or provisional sense be applied to
 the human order of experience, as distinct from the world of nature investigated by the
 physical and biological sciences.
 When the object of investigation is nothing other than ourselves, our social relation-
 ships and the institutions we create arising out of these relationships, is there not a
 fundamental anomaly in maintaining here a methodological formula of 'observer' and
 'observed', together with the dichotomy it imposes? The demands inherent in this formula
 call always for the elimination of any trace of 'subjective bias'. Consequently, only the
 behavioural surface of human experience can be objectively disclosed, as the world of
 experience itself which underlies this surface is radically subjective in its nature and can
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 never be disclosed with the kind of objectivity demanded by the natural sciences. For
 instance, a purely objective study-say a carefully designed questionnaire-can perhaps
 show a significant correlation between pupils' academic performance in school and such
 things as the values of pupils' parents, families and peer groups, observed levels of'intro-
 version', 'extraversion' or 'deviance' in pupils, mixed or single sex classrooms. Such a
 study cannot, however, disclose the more vital character, flavour or atmosphere of peer
 group, home life or classroom, or trace the vital connection between, on the one hand,
 what is observed as 'introversion', 'extraversion' or 'deviance' and, on the other, the
 context of experience where these arise.
 Inorganic properties and processes can be said to behave in certain ways. The same can
 be said of plants, animals and other organic entities. It is doubtful however if any of these
 can properly be said to experience. Even if it were granted that a sense of experience of
 some kind could be attributed to them it would be very different from the type of experi-
 ence we know, and have historically known, as human. Hence a methodology designed to
 discover the behaviours of entities and processes in an objective and conclusive manner
 cannot simply be employed in a field whose unique characteristic is self-conscious human
 experience, which is both personal and interpersonal in nature. An uncritical adoption by
 social or human sciences of the methodology of the natural sciences sometimes may (and
 indeed does) produce creditable results. Such results are most likely to occur when regu-
 larities in observed characteristics and behaviours (as witnessed by significant degrees of
 correlation) bear a direct relation to the experiences which account for them. Where such
 regularities are not present, however; where exhibited behaviour serves only as an in-
 direct, enigmatic or even misleading clue to the experiences which underlie it-and
 this may often be the case with people's deeper feelings, particularly when subjected
 to formal questioning-then the inadequacies and the methodological inappropriateness
 of empirical methods of investigation become apparent, whenever they claim a primacy
 or exclusiveness in disclosing the characteristic features of the more important aspects of
 human thought, discourse and action. Hence the need for empirical educational research
 to acknowledge the tentative status of its findings can now be seen as a methodological
 necessity. The extent to which research fails to carry out this acknowledgement and
 asserts instead a claim to primacy or exclusiveness measures the extent of its own short-
 comings as a scientific endeavour.
 This investigation of some of the presuppositions of empirical enquiry in the social
 sciences enables us to recognise now that the question of what it means to educate, or to
 become educated, calls not merely for an analysis of conditions as they are in any par-
 ticular educational system-whether or not carried out by the empirical methods of the
 natural sciences-but calls more fundamentally for a method which facilitates its proper
 unfolding as a question worthy of the most rigorous and painstaking research. In the
 second part of this essay an attempt will be made to give an outline of such a method and
 in this way will seek to articulate a context which brings some conception of the fullness of
 human understanding satisfactorily within our grasp. The possession of such an under-
 standing should then help us to approach the question of education in a truly original
 manner and should also help us to say something positive about the relation between
 different kinds of research in education.
 THE INTERPRETATIVE-HISTORICAL STRUCTURE OF UNDERSTAND-
 ING
 Our understanding of ourselves, of the social world in which we live and of worlds of
 experience or traditions different from our own, is never free from presuppositions.
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 Indeed, it is an accumulation of previous understandings, which have become significant
 to us in one way or another, which enables us to understand anything new. But in enabling
 us to understand something new our previous experience of understanding influences the
 manner in which that new understanding takes place. In other words, human under-
 standing is quite erroneously thought of when it is characterised as a presuppositionless
 acquisition of knowledge. This is to argue that understanding is never merely cognitive
 but is always an interpretative act in which one's previous experiences play a central part.
 For instance, agreeable or disagreeable, easy or difficult experiences of mathematics, a
 foreign language, or of schooling more generally will play a vital part in how a pupil will
 come to view further encounters in these fields. It might be objected here that, while this
 may be the case with understanding a field of study or experience of which one has
 already had some experiences, the interpretative characterisation of understanding
 breaks down when one raises the question of introductory experience in any field, or, in
 other words, the question of how understanding of something of which one has had no
 previous experience comes about in the first place.
 An examination of the question raised in this objection is called for here as its resolution
 has decisive consequences for the context in which research of any kind is carried out.
 This is, indeed, a major question which occupied the energies of the most important
 thinkers in the history of western philosophy since Plato suggested in his Meno that the
 human capacity to understand, or to acquire knowledge, arose from the pre-existent
 structure of the soul, which enabled it to collect, or more precisely recollect, its unfolding
 experiences into the context of its former, more ideal prehuman existence [I7]. Although
 many later philosophers found Plato's argument on this issue unacceptable, the notion of
 human understanding as something having an a priori or pre-experiential structure,
 rather than a haphazard or accidental character, prevailed and found perhaps its next
 most radical expression in the writings of Kant. Kant argued that 'understanding' is the
 "faculty of cognition through concepts" [18]. These concepts in turn he divided into
 two kinds: first, a posteriori concepts, namely those abstracted from sense perceptions and,
 secondly, a priori concepts, which, in being prior to experience, enable us to order or
 arrange sense perceptions and the concepts abstracted from them in certain ways. One of
 Kant's most decisive contributions to philosophy was his thesis that the notions of space
 and time were a priori rather than a posteriori in nature [I9]. In other words, he argued
 that space and time-notions which pervade every moment of our daily experience-are
 not abstracted from that experience as it unfolds, but are already presupposed or 'taken for
 granted' and that it is this very pre-supposition or 'taken for grantedness', of which one
 may scarcely be conscious, which enables one's experience to unfold as it does, i.e. as
 something having an intelligible character.
 Kant then proceeded to show that 'Ideas' of pure reason, namely general notions which
 do not correspond to anything which can in its fullness be humanly experienced (e.g.
 freedom, immortality, soul, God),
 may yet, in a fundamental and unobserved fashion, be of service to the under-
 standing as a canon for its extended and consistent employment...... (that is)
 an indispensibly necessary regulative employment, namely, that of directing the
 understanding towards a certain goal upon which the routes marked out by its
 rules converge. [20]
 Hence, when guided by pure reason, the understanding, Kant points out, is informed by
 and directed towards ideal standards, which in themselves cannot be attained, but without
 which, purposeful human discourse would lack any fundamental coherence. Hence
 Kant's investigations of the conditions which made understanding in its various modes
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 possible showed convincingly that understanding was itself structured in particular ways
 prior to experience and that it was this very structure which made what we recognise as
 experience possible.
 The researches of Heidegger have given a new and decisive impetus to this question.
 Rather than considering understanding as a "faculty of cognition through concepts" as
 Kant had done, Heidegger argues that understanding is itself a basic mode of man's
 presence in a world [21]. Thus, whereas a 'faculty' has the character of something we may
 or may not wish to employ, a basic mode of being is something prior to all faculties which
 constitutes us as human and from which we cannot get away, even if we want to. Under-
 standing, in this sense, also includes mis-understanding, attempted understanding and
 incomplete or privative understanding. What is understood when understanding takes
 place (i.e. the contents of understanding) also becomes a focal point of Heidegger's
 investigation. In traditional philosophical discourse this was called the 'object of know-
 ledge or 'of consciousness', but all such designations, Heidegger argues, were based on a
 serious oversight. In holding an essentially cognitive and substantive view of under-
 standing, traditional epistemologies did not do justice to the complexities of what is
 understood and also overlooked the social nature of the world in which understanding
 takes place. In other words, the problem of understanding was traditionally viewed as one
 of a relation between a 'conscious knowing' entity and an entity to be 'known'. The
 procedure of distinguishing the knowing entity by adding to it cognitive, intellectual or
 spiritual 'attributes' was rarely systematically carried out on the 'known'-which thus
 remained undistinguished, but in any case such a distinguishing procedure does not alter
 the fact that the knowing entity was fundamentally characterised as a thinking 'substance'
 or thing: a res cogitans [22]. Where being human was characterised in this abstract way the
 crucial importance of its social nature was invariably overlooked. Indeed it is difficult to
 see how a social dimension could be accommodated in any significant sense in a meta-
 physics whose language was that of substance categories.
 What these metaphysical accounts overlooked, namely the 'contents' of understanding
 and the social context of the person who understands, are precisely what give to the inter-
 pretative characterisation of understanding its decisive thrust. Again, Heidegger points
 out that the structure of understanding is such, that, whenever we understand something,
 we simultaneously interpret it as something of a particular sort rather than as an undis-
 tinguished 'object of understanding' [23]. We understand other people as people or,
 more importantly, as friends, as neighbours, as enemies, as fellow citizens, as foreigners.
 We could also understand them more formally as corporeal entities to which distinguishing
 attributes are then added. We understand music as classical, as traditional, as popular. We
 could also understand music as 'sound' to which distinguishing tonal and melodic pat-
 terns are then added. We understand tools as hammers, saws, spanners, etc. but we could
 also understand them as metallic matter forged or moulded to particular shapes and
 strengths. That which we fail to understand we understand as puzzling or incompre-
 hensible. All of this is stated not to stress what is already obvious, but rather to underline
 the point that every act of understanding is also an act of informal or formal interpretation
 whether consciously or unconsciously; otherwise it is not an act of understanding at all.
 Proceeding now from the complex nature of what is understood to an examination of
 the social context in which understanding takes place, it is necessary to point out, first,
 that this context is not merely a social one but is more precisely a historical-social one.
 Long before we ever begin any self-examination we understand ourselves in a self-
 evident way in the family and society in which we grow up. The very self-evidence or
 naturalness of this kind of understanding may cause us to overlook its historical nature.
 The context where this kind of understanding takes place is one where certain beliefs,
This content downloaded from 149.157.61.163 on Tue, 15 Aug 2017 08:57:56 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 A Critique of Educational Research 149
 attitudes and modes of behaviour are valued and others are discouraged. What is valued or
 discouraged in this way is rarely an arbitrary decision of any individual but more normally
 arises from tradition. Tradition and established practice largely determine the character
 of the social world in which we grow up and, although it is amply possible to take issue
 with tradition, to criticise its perceived narrowness or prejudices on any number of
 points, it is not possible effectively to abandon or overthrow it on any wide scale, as the
 history of revolutions and revolutionary movements has shown [24]. Neither is it possible
 for any individual to declare that tradition will no longer have a place in his or her life.
 Where this is attempted, what invariably happens is that one attempts to abandon one
 tradition only to find oneself involved in another tradition, or in other traditions.
 In understanding anything then, we stand always within a tradition and in this way
 tradition itself structures our understanding; it always exerts a subtle, but decisive
 influence on the manner in which we understand. This influence, Hans-Georg Gadamer
 has recently described as the principle of 'effective history' [25], i.e. in understanding
 anything we are always subject to the effects of our own history on our interpretations.
 Thus whenever we design a method of enquiry with a view to letting the facts of what we
 observe 'speak for themselves' in an objective way, we miss an essential dimension of what
 we are investigating if we take what is thus revealed-an immediate appearance-as the
 whole truth. The validity of what is revealed always depends on the validity of the question
 asked, so unless the method in question self-critically examines its questions in the con-
 text of its own effective history or, in other words, examines the kind of presuppositions
 considered in the previous section of this essay, it operates on questionable found-
 ations.
 It should not be concluded from these remarks however that in understanding or
 interpreting anything we are entirely at the mercy of tradition, or that an examination of
 the presuppositions would merely reveal that what we are to investigate is already pre-
 determined in its outcome by the effects of history on our understanding. The inter-
 pretative characterisation of understanding shows that this is precisely not the case
 wherever a truly alert historical consciousness is brought into play. For just as our pre-
 vious, or historical context of experience influences the manner in which we interpret
 particulars, the particulars we interpret also modify the context of our experience, and
 can do so in a beneficial way which corrects the prejudices and assumptions which we
 initially bring to the particular question or issue we are attempting to understand. This
 event recalls to mind an ancient rule of hermeneutics (i.e. the art of textual interpretation),
 that the whole must be understood in terms of its details and the details in terms of the
 whole [26]. This old hermeneutic principle can be seen from the above arguments to
 play a central part in the interpretative characterisation of understanding which has been
 outlined. The structure of understanding and interpretation can thus be seen to be circular
 rather than simply linear in nature. An example illustrates this: my previous experiences in
 a given field provide me with some context or 'whole' (albeit an inadequate or preju-
 dicial one) which enables me to anticipate in certain meaningful ways the particular issues
 and questions I encounter in this field. My understanding of the particular issues or
 questions is advanced in the encounter and as a result I also get a clearer, and more ad-
 vanced notion of the context itself. This clearer notion can now serve as a more adequate
 starting point for my next encounter with further particular questions in this field [27].
 Clearly, this process can also operate conversely. For instance, initial prejudices or as-
 sumptions can be confirmed and strengthened rather than overcome as one's experience
 unfolds.
 What we have argued in this section concerning the nature of human understanding
 should now help us to articulate a context of enquiry where the question of education can
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 in its fullness be brought to light and where scholarly attempts to understand the manifold
 aspects of this question can find a secure and satisfactory foundation.
 THE INTERPRETATIVE-HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF EDUCATION-
 AL RESEARCH
 What we understand by tradition is not merely a heritage of attitudes, beliefs, customs,
 cultural and artistic forms inherited from the past. Tradition also includes patterns of
 scientific and technological accomplishments, patterns of development in trade, com-
 merce and industry, which are distinguishing marks of a society, and includes further the
 human benefits or conflicts to which such accomplishments and developments give rise.
 Hence to acknowledge our social nature as humans is also to acknowledge that we always
 stand within tradition. Very often indeed our 'philosophies' of education are founded on
 an inadequate or distorted acknowledgement of our standing within tradition, with the
 result that the conflicts in tradition itself give rise to conflicting educational ideologies.
 As soon as educational discourse becomes primarily characterised by continuing disputes
 between these ideologies, a primordial or original understanding of education becomes
 more difficult to establish and may even become threatened with obscurity. A radical
 acknowledgement of what it means to stand within tradition, however, allows us, for the
 first time, to bring within our grasp an understanding of education which contains no
 ideological programme. Hence we can characterise education as the fruitful interplay
 between the unfolding experience of an individual and the movements of tradition. On a wider
 scale, education can be characterised as the interplay between the self-understanding of a
 society, including its various sub-cultures, and the traditions it encounters in its daily
 experience. If it is objected that such a characterisation contains no explicit or recognis-
 able educational aims it must at once be replied that the characterisation itself expresses
 an aim to be realised, namely the bringing about of a fruitful interplay. If more specific
 aims are sought, for example "the preparation of an individual for membership of society"
 [28], ideological elements begin to creep in, in the form of a 'hidden curriculum' or an
 explicit programme of indoctrination through which such 'preparation' takes place. To
 conceive of tradition, therefore, as something which must simply be passed on through
 education is precisely to overlook the nature and the educational importance of tradition
 itself.
 These remarks require that the nature of the interplay suggested needs to be examined
 more closely now, together with an examination of what makes the interplay fruitful.
 Tradition itself, or indeed any particular aspect of it, is a field abundant with aims,
 ambitions, fulfillments and frustrations. This becomes clear on a moment's reflection
 whenever we encounter the development of man's accomplishments and failures, whether
 in science, literature, industry, politics or in his concern for fellow humans. Our daily
 experiences of competing and often conflicting claims for our energies, allegiances and
 aspirations, show equally clearly the unceasing penetration of our lives by tradition. Now
 any aspect of tradition can become a field of study for educational purposes. This is
 normally accomplished through the selection of material under clearly defined subject
 areas such as History, Chemistry, Mathematics, Sociology, Languages, Literature and so
 on, although interdisciplinary approaches, which suggest such titles as Social and En-
 vironmental Studies, Media Studies, Development Studies and so on, are recently gaining
 in importance. What is crucial in the selection and presentation of curriculum material
 however is that a genuine encounter with tradition is facilitated. In other words, it is
 crucial that pupils or students are addressed by something which is living, and which there-
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 fore speaks to their own experiences. This is what is meant by bringing about an interplay,
 and as an educational task it describes the work of the teacher.
 We are arguing therefore that a teacher understands his or her purposes in a properly
 educational light only when he or she gives primary importance to making pupils and
 students aware of the vital life of Mathematics, of Physics, of Literature etc. or, more
 simply, aware that what is being studied has something important, or potentially im-
 portant to say to them. The alternative for the teacher is to take the view that so much
 syllabus material must be covered, so much knowledge must be instilled, to comply with
 examination or other requirements. There lurks continually in this latter approach the
 possibility that the student may master the material formally and give a creditable per-
 formance when required to do so, but that he or she will remain unmoved by, or even
 moved to a positive dislike of, the subjects taught in this way. This danger is highlighted
 in one of Dewey's remarks which argues as follows:
 Perhaps one of the greatest pedagogical fallacies is the notion that a person learns
 only the particular thing he is studying at the time. Collateral learning in the
 way of formation of enduring attitudes, of likes and dislikes, may be and often is
 much more important than the spelling lesson or less in geography or history that
 is learned. [28]
 The dimension of 'collateral learning' mentioned here by Dewey is the dimension of the
 student's experience which, as we previously saw, lies inwardly active beneath the surface
 of displayed behaviour. In order to bring about a fruitful interplay with any aspect of
 tradition it is precisely this experiental dimension which must be addressed, reached and
 most importantly, moved by the curriculum or, more particularly, by the teacher's
 understanding and presentation of the curriculum. If it is the teacher who must in prac-
 tice attempt to make the interplay with aspects and movements of tradition a fruitful one,
 then the teacher needs to be assisted in this work by educational research, for the task to
 be accomplished is by no means a process of simple instruction, or didactic lecturing.
 One of the major questions for educational research thus becomes that of discovering
 how a field of study or context selected from tradition can, through a teacher or other
 medium, be brought into a progressively fruitful dialogue with pupils or students. A
 further task becomes that of working out practical ways of achieving this purpose with
 pupils of different ages, social backgrounds, temperaments and abilities. In order to
 embark on this work in any successful measure educational research must first, as we
 previously illustrated, understand the historical-social context in which it operates or,
 in other words, must be clearly aware of how the researcher's own effective history
 always remains active and influential, and all the more powerfully so in any methodology
 which claims to have eliminated 'subjective bias'. This is to suggest that the person who
 engages in educational research must be trained not only in the conventional methodology
 of his or her own discipline, whether psychology, sociology, history, anthropology or
 philosophy, but must also be continually and critically conscious of the interpretative
 foundations of that discipline in the structure of understanding; or must have, in Gada-
 mer's words, a "hermeneutically trained mind" [30].
 In examining his data therefore, the educational researcher, as psychologist, anthro-
 pologist, sociologist, historian or philosopher, must recognise that he is being addressed
 by products of human experience-an experience which he understands in a different way
 than any mere organic process is understood. Hence, rather than simply impose his own
 methodological scheme on the data he must be prepared for the data to tell him something
 new, and to tell him in a challenging manner which may even break asunder the methodo-
 logical classifications and categories designed to accommodate and process the data. In
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 this way, just as the researcher must be sensitive to the historical influences in his own
 context of experience he must also be sensitive to the particular qualities and nuances
 of the human context he is attempting to understand. What Gadamer says of sensitivity
 in textual interpretation can equally be applied here if we take the researcher's data as the
 'text' to be understood:
 this kind of sensitivity involves neither 'neutrality' in the matter of the object
 nor the extinction of one's self, but the conscious assimilation of one's own fore-
 meanings and prejudices. The important thing is to be aware of one's own bias,
 so that the text may present itself in all its newness and thus be able to assert
 its own truth against one's own fore-meanings. [3I]
 From this it now becomes clearer that if, when attempting to understand anything, we
 remain unaware of the preconceptions and prejudices we bring with us from our previous
 experience: if we merely proceed with a naive faith in an established method, then our
 overlooked preconceptions and prejudices prevent us from understanding properly what
 we seek to understand because they constitute the fixed horizon beyond which we cannot
 effectively see. With the disciplined attempt to become aware of our prejudices on the
 other hand, we do not naively assume that our present understanding has a superior
 status over all previous understanding. Rather we begin to realise what it means to have a
 horizon: the shifting limits of our own context of experience become more visible to us
 together with an awareness that ours is never an independently fixed or isolated context
 but is continually being formed from the movements of tradition itself. Understanding,
 then, is the fusion of contexts which are different from one another (one's own and that
 which one is attempting to understand) but which both belong to the continuity of tradi-
 tion.
 It is of special importance that the understanding which takes place in educational, or
 indeed any research-as distinct from everyday understandings in social intercourse-
 should be an exemplary case of understanding. No real fusion occurs when the methodo-
 logical context of the researcher attempts, albeit unwittingly, to dominate the context to be
 examined or, alternatively, where research itself becomes dominated by the dogmatic
 imperatives of an authoritarian tradition. The fusion is truly productive only when the
 awareness of historical prejudices in his own context enables the researcher to interpret
 and distinguish more clearly the prejudices which lie in tradition itself. Thus, through the
 circular interplay between the interpreter and tradition described earlier, the researcher
 questions tradition and is in turn questioned by tradition as his own questions begin to be
 answered. This in turn leads to a further questioning of tradition, and so the circle
 continues into a 'spiral' which enables the researcher to anticipate ever more productive
 encounters and to bring to light in the process findings and recommendations which can,
 if taken up and acted upon by teachers, colleges of education, educational institutions and
 providing agencies, and not least by other educational researchers, make human ex-
 perience more richly educational for individuals and for communities more widely [32].
 In the process just described no distinctions are drawn between different disciplines of
 educational research. This is deliberate as the argument which has been put forward
 includes in its scope all forms of legitimate enquiry into the human condition. The
 productive encounters with tradition to which we have just referred are equally possible
 for psychology, sociology, anthropology and philosophy as they are for history itself.
 What must, however, be borne in mind in order to achieve this productive encounter is
 the interpretative historical nature of human understanding, as it operates in these
 disciplines. In this way, educational research, adequately understood, can lead not only
 to real improvements in the efficiency of a particular educational system, but can also
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 show how, on a wide scale, tradition itself can be brought to light in such a way that it
 does not dominate us, or seek merely our thoughtless acquiescence, but rather that it
 becomes genuinely thoughtworthy for us, that we become enabled to question it articu-
 lately and to ask for articulate answers.
 The productive involvement with tradition which thus distinguishes education opens
 up new possibilities for human fulfillment or indeed for human suffering, and in this way
 tradition itself can become enriched or impoverished. Our success in this endeavour, that
 of enriching our research, our educational practice and our lives more generally, can be
 measured by the extent to which we can still extend to those who come after us, the
 promise of human fulfillment.
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